Japan's post-war political-ideological struggle and the constitutional debate: SDF deployment to Iraq 2004 as the center focus of Japan's foreign policy formation

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論文の和文日本の戦後における政治的イデオロギー闘争と憲法上の議論：日本の外交政策形成の中心的焦点としての 2004 年イラクへの自衛隊派遣について[1]

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要　旨

第二次世界大戦の終結以来、日本は米国による安全保障と、1947 年、米国によって記された憲法に定められた項目と、その後の両同盟国間の合意によって補強された取り決めに依存してきた。憲法第 9 条は、日本が紛争へ参加することや旧来式の軍隊を創設することを禁じている。日本の外交および安全保障政策に多大な影響を与えた国際的事件とは、2001 年 9 月 11 日の米国領土内におけるテロ攻撃と、ジョージ W ブッシュによるアフガニスタンおよびイラクでの米国主導の戦争であった。2003 年以降、自衛隊をイラク戦争へ参加させるという日本の決定は、1947 年に日本の平和主義憲法が採択された後、日本国外への部隊派遣の歴史において、非常に画期的な一歩であった。この決定は、2003 年にイラクへの最後通告を通知したジョージ W ブッシュ米大統領への小泉純一郎首相による非常に迅速な支援表明となり、多くの日本国民による反対にもかかわらず行われたものであった。

日本政府が法律を制定するための困難な障害を克服することに成功したことで、米国との同盟を強化する新たな段階への道が開かれ、他の政党との安全保障協力においてもかつてない機会が開かれ、さらに緊急事態における対応能力も高まった。しかし、そのような決定の背後にある日本の公式、非公式の目標とは何だったのか。迅速な意思決定への道を開いた要因と理由とは。この動きが米国との同盟を強化することによって、あるいは米国の覇権から離れることによっても、日本が安全保障政策を発展させることにどのように役立った。

ただし、これらの決定の背後にある理由を包括的に理解するために、1945 年前後の日本の外交政策の背景と、この政策に影響を与える要因（世論、影響力のある人物、政治家や官僚）、特に吉田ドクトリンの政治の調和に関する政策策定、そして 1991 年の湾岸戦争、2003 年のイラク侵攻と占領への自衛隊の参加を通じて、これら政策の発展について考察する。国内の政治的要因（特に多元主義者の外交政策決定における見解）と現実主義に根ざした戦略的思考の両方に焦点を当てた政策は、目標を達成するため非常に効果的である。

本稿では、対外的地域課題、日米同盟、国内政治と、特に世論を、日本の外交政策決定での可能要因と制限要因として位置づけ、イラク戦争における日本の政策対応の相違に焦点を当て、論述する。また、日本の外交政策と全方位外交の現実主義と米国を通した防衛戦略と日本が「普通の国」になるため実行してきたことに関しても議論する。さらに、参加の決定につながった最も決定的な要因（エリート、リーダーシップ、小泉のトップダウン政策プロセス、野党の役割）と自衛隊任務の本質に関する詳細についても、この参加の背後にある日本の目標に関する明確な理解のため、取り組む予定である。

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INTRODUCTION

Certain moments in the nation's past constitute genuine "turning points," events that result in fundamental structural and policy changes that forever alter the nation's character.[2] In Japan's modern history, two such turning points happened because of the United States; both had a lasting impact on Japan's foreign policy:

> The first happened in 1853 when Commodore Matthew C. Perry's fleet of warships steamed into Tokyo Bay to force Japan to abandon its almost 250-year-old policy of sakoku, 鎖国 or "closed nation," and open its borders to western trade. Perry's arrival affected the issue of opening Japan to the foreign barbarians and the victory in the civil war of the so-called realists who understood that Japan had to defer to western military superiority.[3]

The civil war concluded with the "restoration" of the emperor and the beginning of the Meiji Era (1868- 1912). The new leadership dedicated efforts to rapid economic, political, and military development. Yukichi Fukuzawa (福澤 諭吉), who coined the national slogan of “to escape Asia”, was the foremost enlightenment thinker end educator of Meiji Japan, viewed Asia not only as a geographic entity, but as a barbaric state of civilization. He believed that national purpose of Meiji Japan was to enter Europe to become civilized.[4]

> Enriching the nation, strengthening the military"(fukoku kyohei) 富国強兵 and "civilization and enlightenment" (bummei kaika) 文明開化 were the two most important of several slogans adopted by Meiji oligarchs to symbolize their policy of catching up with the West and regaining sovereignty by negotiating an end to the unequal treaties.[5]

Military victories over China in the 1890s, a military alliance with England in 1902, the annexation of Korea in 1910, and entry into World War I on the side of the Allies together represented Japan's entry into the international society of "civilized," i.e., imperialist, nations.[6] Inazo Nitobe (新渡戸稲造)-, Japan’s representative to the League of Nations during the 1920s justified Japan's territorial and political expansion into Asian continent by portraying Japan as an agent of progress. By 1937 Japan was at war with China, had allied itself with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in 1940, and with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, set for itself an irrevocable policy of war and conquest under the rhetoric of creating a "Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere”[7] , which was presented as a justification for Japanese military expansion in the name of liberating Asia from Western imperialism and which brought on the disaster of World War II.

By early 1945 the Americans began bombing Japanese cities, utterly devastating Tokyo with fire bombs, and, destroying Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August with atomic bombs. By war's end, the Japanese reckoned that some three million citizens had lost their lives during the war. The economy was in shambles, unemployment was high, food production was dangerously low, factory production had been crippled, the wartime government and its expansionist policies had been discredited, and aggressive nationalism had been exposed as a failed doctrine.[8]

Previous and subsequent events have created the right conditions for the start of the second turning point in Japan's modern history, which started with Japan's American Interlude, 1945-52, fashioned by Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas Mac- Arthur. During those seven years SCAP policy laid the basis for Japan's foreign policy up until the present day. In a few words, America's foreign policy became Japan's; the occupation made Japan into a "junior partner" in an American-led alliance.[9]

> Japan's economy had progressed from dependency to inter- dependency with the United States, in at least some areas, notably defense, economic diplomacy, and policies toward the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and South Africa, Japan has devised foreign policies independent of and even occasionally at odds with American policy stances.[10]

1. Japan’s Foreign Policy

1.1 The Realism of Japan’s Foreign Policy

Japan has pursued a special and unique policy since 1945 until the present because of the circumstances that accompanied and followed the US occupation to the country and the peaceful constitution, as well as the painful history

caused by Japan to Asian countries.

> The cornerstone of Japan's post-war foreign policy has been its bilateral relationship with the United States. The relationship was grounded in Japan's defeat in World War II, its terms largely defined during the American Occupation of Japan (1945-52), and cemented in the 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, amended somewhat in 1960 and renewed every 10 years. The importance of the U.S.-Japan tie was underscored by Okita Saburo 大来佐武郎 former Foreign Minister of Japan (1979-81), "Japan's relations with the entire world have been shaped by being under America's economic, social, and political wing"[11]

> This relationship is also described by Robert Scalapino[12] as the "marriage", when he wrote in 1990; saying that the Japanese stake in the economic health of the United States is steadily gaining. Thus, a divorce is unthinkable even if the marriage remains troubled.[13] The two previous metaphors (under America's wing and marriage) analogy bespeak a crucial truth about this relationship, and hence about Japan's foreign policy. The facts of this changing relationship give meaning to both metaphors. In the American military occupation of Japan, SCAP sought nothing less than to remake Japan's political and economic systems in the American image, and, with the beginning of the Cold War, to use Japan as the critical link in America's are of containment around the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.[14]

Article 9, commonly known as the "peace clause," has helped make pacifism the ideology of most Japanese. It has shifted the sovereign responsibility for defense to Japan's military protector, the United States. Over the years the arrangement has nurtured a deep sense of dependency, even to the extent of legitimizing "freeridership" under the American hegemonic umbrella. Nevertheless, Article 9, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, formed the basis of Japan's foreign policy in the immediate postwar period.[15]

> Japan’s prevailing postwar foreign policy strategy was what eventually developed into a Doctrine – the Yoshida Doctrine. The doctrine is named after Prime Minister Yoshida (1948-52), who skillfully guided Japan into a postwar era with new interests, new alliances, and new cleavages on the international scene. In addition to the primacy of the U.S.-alliance, the fundamental pillars of the Yoshida Doctrine have been minimal spending on defense, no involvement in international conflict, and, most importantly, a national concentration on economic reconstruction and industrialization to maximize the economic growth.[16]

Internally, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida had succeeded to make a grand bargain with the United States by establishing a security strategy that trod a line in domestic politics between what conservatives (rearmament) and progressives (unarmed neutrality) expected. Security protection by the United States in return for bases meant that delivering something to both camps—security for the conservatives and a restriction on Japan’s military capacity for the progressives. Eventually, these politics developed into the orthodox consensus of Japan’s Cold War security policy that came to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine.[17]

The establishment of the JSDF in 1954 and to the simultaneous signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and US-Japan Security Treaty in 1951 meant that Japan committed to minimal rearmament. This level of rearmament reassured East Asian

neighbors and domestic opposition that Japan was not retreading the path of becoming a significant regional military power and at the same time, satisfied the US and conservative pressures for a greater national defense effort. Through concluding the peace treaty, Japan was able to regain its independence and mitigate international and domestic pressures. Under the revised treaty of 1960, explicit guarantees from the United States in return for its provision to the US military of bases on Japanese territory. Moreover, the United States provided extended nuclear deterrence.[18] As of fiscal 2015, Japan was shouldering 86.4 percent of the cost of stationing American troops in the country, according to Japanese Defense Ministry calculations.[19]

Democratization should not be overlooked when studying Japan's foreign policy because it has been the second of the occupation's two goals and a central to Japan's alliance with the United States. Occupation leaders operated on the assumption that democracies tend not to be aggressors in international politics, and therefore believed that democratization was as important as demilitarization in transforming Japan into a peace-loving state.[20]

In spite of the Japanese economy raced ahead in the 1960s and 1970s, national confidence remained elusive in Japan as a result of the impact of the shock of defeat in WWII. Public schools, for example, refrained from teaching children the national anthem and displaying the national flag at official ceremonies.[21]

> Devoid of confidence, Japan had to look outside its borders to find a source for its new national identity. Whereas national identity is generally a celebration of the nation's distinctiveness, Japan's postwar national identity has been predicated on the need to be more like the West, especially the United States. The Japanese have regarded events that signified Japan’s acceptance into the Western international order as a major foreign policy accomplishment. Most notable among these has been Japan entry into the pillar organizations of Pax Americana: GATT, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and development, and the G-7.[22]

Japan’s foreign policy is described by (Green 2001) as “reluctant realism”[23] Shokyokutekiriarism 消極的リアリズム and “resentful realism” Ikareruriarism 怒れるリアリズム by (Hughes 2015) which focus on emphasizing that Japan has been engaging in security – minded realpolitik foreign policy. Neorealist explains how the international system tends to find itself reverting to a balanced distribution of power when the previous balance is disturbed. The (defensive) neorealism explains that states’ goals are to maximize security (not power, which is the goal of offensive realists).[24] A defensive realist foreign policy is a rational, realpolitik foreign policy. It does not maximize the pursuit of power because that would ultimately draw the attention of counter-balancers. Such a description certainly seems apt when applied to the immediate security concerns of Japanese foreign policy. Due to the increasing security threats over the past few decades, Japan found itself in an increasing insecure concern. North Korea has been major security concern because it has developed a weaponized nuclear program and tested ballistic missiles which could threat Japan’s territory with a nuclear strike. China’s surging economy and its accompanying rise in military spending over the past 25 years have occurred simultaneously with Japan’s two decades of economic stagnation. Intensification of historical controversies over Japan’s imperial past with China and the long-standing territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have put more pressures on Japan in terms of security threats. Beijing’s aggressive behavior, in particular in the maritime domain and it’s militarily and economically rising have

been both necessary and sufficient in terms of explaining Japan's counterbalancing response.[25]

> Neorealist analysis asserts that Japan will be increasingly cajoled by the deteriorating international security environment to convert its economic strength into military strength, and to aspire to great power status, even through the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Japan's principal reason for maintaining its anomalous international status as a relatively demilitarized nation in the postwar period has been its reliance on US hegemony and its concomitant opportunity to relegate to the United States the heavy lifting required to ensure its national security.[26]

While Constructivists argue that the primary drivers of Japan's security choices are deeply embedded domestic norms, particularly pacifism and anti-militarism. These norms are diffused among policymaking institutions and Japanese society more widely and lead to an ingrained resistance to the Japanese state's use of military power for national security ends or the glorification of the military. Constructivists contend that these norms are sufficiently strong to counteract international structural pressures, providing a high degree of continuity and resistance to the remilitarization of Japanese security policy—even to the point of it's becoming an "immovable object".[27]

This debate continues within the corridors of Japanese politicians, especially between the ruling party and the opposition parties. For decades, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party LDP has sought to amend Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution to bring it into line with the actual presence of Japanese naval, air and ground forces in the so-called Self-Defense Forces. Article 9 stipulates that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation" and "land, sea, and air forces, as well as another war potential, will never be maintained." But the SDF, which boast one of the largest defense budgets in the world, is a potent military force. How is this legal? [28]

Changing the Constitution requires two-thirds majorities in both chambers of the Diet[29] and a simple majority in a national referendum. More than half of people in Japan oppose amending the nation's postwar pacifist Constitution under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's government.56.0 percent opposed Abe's drive for constitutional revision, while 32.2 expressed support.[30]

1.2 The Elite and Policy Making in Japan

So far as foreign policy making is concerned, the Japanese system, like the American system, has all the earmarks of an elitist democracy. Political conditions in Japan after 1945 allowed the emergence of many institutions and bodies involved in decision-making. However, the parties, personalities and institutions in force dominated the process of decision-making.

> Pluralistic Japan's political system is becoming, foreign policy since the war, but most especially in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, has been made by the Prime Minister, his cabinet, a few factional leaders within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and high-ranking bureaucrats of the most powerful ministries, especially International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Finance (MOF). By the 1980s, policy-oriented rank and file LDP politicians, aligned in so-called zoku 族 (tribes), as well as bureaucrats from other ministries, began playing more important, if less conspicuous, roles in the policy process. Interest groups such as big business and farmers defer to

the governing elites whose record in promoting economic nationalism, as embodied in the Yoshida Doctrine, has served them and the nation profitably for so many years.[31]

The LDP was formed in November 1955 with the merger of two conservative parties — the Japan Democratic Party and the Liberal Party.[32] Since then, the party has almost continuously been in power with some exceptions of a period between 1993 and 1994, and again from 2009 to 2012.[33] The LDP was divided into factions and some of them were rivals; the prime minister had to make coalitions with one or more to come to power, and then appoint some of their members to the cabinet in order to ensure the party would support the government.

There were the zoku (‘policy tribes’) composed of veteran National Diet members holding party, parliament and government positions in particular policy areas. Before reaching the cabinet, all legislation had to go through the party’s policy organ, the Policy Affairs Research Council, with its multiple policy divisions overseen by these policy tribes’ zoku, who to a large extent dominated policymaking.[34]

This means that foreign policy is generally made with as little regard for public opinion as politically feasible. This does not mean that the public is quiescent on controversial issues, nor does it mean that elites always ignore public sentiment when making policy.[35]

There are certain famous examples of elite control over foreign policy in Japan. One of them is the conflict in the parliament in 1960 between right and left wings over ratification of a revised version of the original security treaty in 1951. The right wing objected to the treaty as foreign-imposed, the left objected to any military relationship with the leading parties of the Cold War because they felt that it would result in Japan being targeted in some future nuclear war. After a severe debate in the parliament, Prime Minister Kishi used his LDP majority in the Diet to ramrod ratification of the Treaty. Another example is Japan's policy towards China. Despite strong business between the two countries support for establishing diplomatic relations with China ever since the 1950s, Japan did not open up relations until after the United States first approached the People's Republic of China in 1971.[36]

1.3 Omnidirectional Diplomacy and Hedging towards the US

One of the consequences of World War II was the widespread belief that Japan lacks what is called the “checking mechanism”.

After the war, the vast majority of the Japanese people came to understand that they had been victims of their own state, that the militarists has usurped the power of the state and that there had been no resistance to the militaries determination to mobilize the population for war. For a society that lacks a tradition of effective political dissent, one of the main lessons learned from the experience of World War II is to consciously avoid the espousal of any one principle of action. This helps to explain why, for example, Tokyo pursued an omnidirectional diplomacy in the 1970s, thus damping Cold War loyalties despite Japan’s unquestionable location in the US camp.[37]

Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987) regularly, reminded the Japanese of the need to establish checking mechanism when he pushed for substantial increase in defense spending during the 1980s with encouragement of U.S. President Ronald Reagan.[38]

Despite the progress of the strategic relationship between the United States and Japan, the relationship has undergone such strong shocks that Japan made feel weak. Nixon's visiting to China in 1971 and leaving Japan, the last major power withholding diplomatic recognition from China, and imposing a short-term embargo on soybean exports to Japan are considered as serious shocks to Japan. The two "oil shocks" of the 1970s has exacerbated Japan's sense of vulnerability and heightened its historic sense of "victim consciousness".[39]

Therefore, these shocks were countered by Japan with economic or "resource diplomacy," also more broadly known as "multilateral diplomacy," "omnidirectional diplomacy," and "comprehensive security," all terms used by Japanese foreign policy analysts to refer to the pragmatic and necessary steps such as diversifying various Japanese dependencies and trading relationships, developing overseas' resources, stockpiling crucial commodities at home, and currying favor with primary producers by providing generous "development assistance" in the form of grants and loans.[40] Therefore, Japan's typical position has been to "separate politics from economics" (seikei bunri) 政経分離 .

> During the periods - 1968-72, 1976-78, and to the present-the American predominantly military notion of security and the Japanese predominantly economic notion of security have come into conflict. But because the Japanese tend to believe that their economic security rests on American defense security guarantees and the larger economic benefits gained from the bilateral trading relationship, the Americans invariably enjoy strong leverage in negotiations over trade and other disputes.[41]

During the Cold War, a consensus had formed around the idea that Japan's security should be sought through economics and "peace diplomacy" heiwagaiko 平 和 外 交 . The declining efficacy of Japan's economics-first approach to national security has arguably boosted the appeal of political-military normalization.[42] Japan's vulnerability to China's long-term rise as a strategic competitor in Asia makes concessions to the U.S. the lesser burden to bear.[43] Due to its powerful neighbors, Japan is also considering "hedging".[44]

> Japan's commitment to the Yoshida Doctrine and alignment with the United States has not been without strategic costs, what in international relations literature are referred to as the risks of abandonment and entrapment. Abandonment entails risk that the United States as a global superpower with wider-ranging strategic interests than just the defense of Japan might overlook its security treaty duties, or even abdicate them entirely. Entrapment has long been a constant and greater fear, in that the United States might pursue policies that generate war in the region which Japan would be inevitably drawn into, or even pressure Japan to dispatch the JSDF overseas to support US-led expeditionary warfare.[45]

The Abe administration's strategy, therefore, has been focusing on reinforcing the alliance with the United States to ensure that it remains at the centre of Japanese security policy. Japan has been consistently concerned about America's commitment to Japanese security, pushing, for instance, for an explicit understanding that the disputed Senkaku Islands

come under the US–Japan security treaty.[46] Such concerns have also caused Japan to hedge against US abandonment by attempting to forge better relations elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific.[47]

Japan tried its best to practice a policy of separating economics from politics that is, keeping commercial relations unfettered by political or ideological differences.[48] But, during its economic negotiations with the US, for an instance, and as a result of the US trade deficit with Japan, Japan fears the US security pressures of threatening to withdraw American forces stationed in Japan. This was clear after the US President Trump adopting the policy of "America First" and when he referred in July 2019 to the 1951 Japan-U.S. security treaty as “one-sided".[49]

1.4 Japan's Defense Expenditures

Article 9 gave rise to a range of many antimilitaristic prohibitions including: the 1967 Three Non-Nuclear Principles (not to produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons); the 1967 and 1976 bans on the export of arms and military technology; the 1969 National Diet resolution on the peaceful use of space, and the 1976 1 percent of Gross National Product GNP limit on defense expenditure.[50]

Japan's defense expenditures have always been small as a proportion of its Gross National Product (GNP). This limit of 1% was honored by the Prime Ministers until Prime Minister Nakasone who barely exceeded the limit in 1987.[51]

The most accepted features of Japan's defense profile which constitutes the first reason for keeping defense expenditures low are: a ban on export of arms and military technology, the "three nonnuclear principles; and the periodic reaffirmations by a succession of Prime Ministers to abide by Article 9 of the Constitution. The other aspect of Japanese foreign policy constitutes a second reason for keeping defense expenditures low: the need to reassure former victims of Japanese military aggression that history will not repeat itself. American pressure on Japan to assume greater responsibility for its defense has usually coincided with a comparative weakening of the American economy vis-A-vis Japan's. As a general rule, the higher the American trade deficit with Japan, the louder and more frequent are American calls for Japan to beef up its defense.[52] The further point is that in the U.S.-Japan defense relationship, political and economic issues had gotten intertwined, which remains the situation today. Japan has acquiesced to pay for American troops stationed in its territory, rather than build up militaries solely on its own. Japan paid 0.5% of its GDP in 2007on American troops in Japan.[53]

In 2004, Japan provided for American troops direct support of $3.2 billion and indirect support worth $1.18 billion, offsetting as much as 74.5 percent of the total cost. Defense Minister Tomomi Inada said in 2019 that Japan paid about ¥191 billion in 2015, about 86.4 percent of the total cost. Meanwhile, U.S. Forces said that the approximate cost of the U.S. presence in Japan is $5.5 billion, based on the 2017 Operation and Maintenance Overview by the Office of the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense.[54] The Trump administration is seeking up to a fivefold increase in what Japan pays to support U.S. military forces based in Japan. Trump has long complained that Japan was not contributing enough to its defense and that the U.S. military was being asked to shoulder an unfair burden.[55]

The Japanese government every year allocates a huge amount of Japanese taxpayers' money for the U.S. military-related expenditures including the Omoiyari Yosan (思いやり予算 , lit. sympathy budget)[56]. Among the top 10 high-value U.S. bases, eight are situated in Japan including Kadena Air Base in Okinawa. U.S. bases in Japan carried a total value of 98.2 billion dollars in 2018, the highest among host nations.[57]

1.5 Japan's pursuing to be a Normal State

The Yoshida Doctrine did not offer much direction on how Japan might pursue a more active international role as an advanced economy. At the same time, Americans continued to allege free riding on Japan's part, especially in relation to the 1991 Gulf War, where Japan was disparaged as only delivering 'checkbook diplomacy'.[58]

Such failings set off a new political debate in Japan about how the country should approach international politics and the US alliance in the post–Cold War era. This new debate focused on the idea of becoming a 'normal nation' ' 普通の国 ' (futsū no kuni), within both the context of the US alliance and wider international relations. Some of the LDP members called for taking more responsibilities of a normal nation. They urged Japan of having a strongly globalist vision that loosened the restrictions on Japan's ability to do more on security matters (e.g. peacekeeping), and in this case, Japan should be closely tied to international institutions such as the United Nations rather than just the US alliance".[59]

Some major events happened elsewhere in the world undermined the Japanese pursue towards normalization such as the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998 which exposed Japan's lack of influence in global institutions. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Japanese security concerns quickly shifted toward enhancing the alliance cooperation and America's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.[60]

Conservative Japanese politicians, led by Prime Minister Jun'ichirō Koizumi between 2001 and 2006, began implementing a revisionist idea of Japan as a normal nation, focusing on Japan's role in the alliance which is sometimes being described as 'de facto collective self-defense'. Koizumi pushed Japan toward supporting US activities by passing an anti-terrorism special measures law and dispatching Japanese ships to the Indian Ocean to support US forces operating in Afghanistan, and passing the Iraq Special Measures Law and dispatched Self-Defense Forces to Iraq.[61] These actions were part of a wider revision of Japan's security role, with the focus not only on increasing capabilities but also on reforming institutions and changing norms.[62]

Koizumi had taken a hard stance towards China and South Korea on issues of history. His government took a robust stance against China over its territorial claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and against South Korea's claim to the Takeshima/Tokdo Islands. Moreover, Japan sought to balance China's rise with a build-up of the Japanese Self-Defense Force's capabilities and tightening alliance ties with the United States. Koizumi might argue that he merely asserted Japan's national interests as any 'normal' state would and that he did not seek confrontation with Japan's neighbors.[63]

In the same context, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reiterated his demand that the Diet discusses his Liberal Democratic

Party's proposals for constitutional amendments which include defining the roles of the Self-Defense Forces in the Constitution's war-renouncing Article 9.[64]

1.6 Japan's position towards the US call to collective self - defense and the war against terrorism

The Gulf War to liberate Kuwait in 1991 exposed the limitations of Tokyo's Cold War modus operandi_ securing its overseas interests through the exercise of economic power. Due to increasing pressures by the international community in 1991 to contribute support to the war, the Japanese government attempted to pass enabling legislation.[65] But the Diet balked at the prospect of SDF dispatch, forcing the government to withdraw the bill. As a consequence, Japan underwrote 20 percent of the war's expense, yet received neither gratitude nor respect, and just media accusations of "checkbook diplomacy" satsutabagaiko 札束外交 .[66] The Gulf War's ramifications extended beyond Japan's sense of wounded national pride. Tokyo feared for the bilateral alliance's future credibility, for why would Washington expend blood and treasure to protect a fair-weather ally?[67]

The Bush administration came into office with high hopes for strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. The goal was a closer and more equal partnership on the model of that between America and Britain.[68] From Washington's perspective, there were several key markers of progress toward this partnership. One priority was Japan's willingness to allow its SDF to stand shoulder to shoulder with U.S. forces in regional military conflicts, including those geographically remote from Japan. [69]

> The most obvious impediment was the continued appeal of pacifism as manifest in a widespread aversion to military force, support for Japan's "self-defense only" posture, and acceptance of its constitutional ban on collective defense. Article 9 of Japan's 1947 "Peace Constitution," which renounces the use of military force to settle international disputes, is interpreted to permit self-defense but prohibit collective defense.[70]

The American administration had urged Japan to revise the constitution to eliminate that obstacle because from the American standpoint, the issue was less constitutional than political and psychological- namely Japan's willingness to share the burdens of upholding international peace and security. The question became whether or not Japanese attitude had matured to the point where the SDF would be deployed in the common defense if crises similar to Gulf war 1991 arose.[71]

In 1992, Tokyo relaxed its collective self defense ban to allow SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations. In 1997, Japan had revised its defense cooperation guidelines with the United States to enable the SDF to provide logistical support to U.S. forces in the event of military contingencies near Japan. In 1998, Tokyo agreed to participate in joint research with the United States on a theater missile defense system intended to protect Japan and U.S. bases located there. In 1999 when the SDF "fired its first shot in anger in an encounter with a North Korean "spy boat." In 2000, the Diet established bodies to look into constitutional revision with a view to eventually legitimizing Japan's participation in collective self defense activities.[72]

> Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution does not mention the right to self-defense, regardless of whether it is the right to individual

self-defense or the right to collective self-defense. However, the Japanese Government interprets that Japan has the right to individual self-defense. As for the right to collective self-defense, the Japanese Government had interpreted until 2014 that Japan had the right to collective self-defense as a member of the United Nations, but could not exercise its right. However, in July 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe changed the interpretation of Article 9 so that Japan could exercise the right to collective self-defense.[73]

It's worthy to differentiate here between collective security and collective self-defense. Collective self-defense is authorized, along with individual self-defense, by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Put simply, if a country in the international system has suffered an armed attack, then any other country has the right, but not the duty, to use armed force against the aggressor in reliance upon the principle of collective self-defense. The only preconditions, in addition to the determination that an armed attack has occurred or is irrevocably in motion, are that the use of force is deemed necessary, that the force is proportionate to that used in the attack or the threat posed, and that it is immediate. In contrast, collective security involves the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security, as authorized by the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII, and specifically Article 42, of the U.N. Charter. There need be no "armed attack" as a conditional precedent, but merely a determination by the Security Council that there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, such that the use of force or other measures are required to maintain or restore international peace and security.[74]

During the years 2001–2005, the Diet laid the groundwork for amending Japan's constitution. In 2005, a majority of the Lower House panel favored amending Article 9, but the Upper House commission failed to reach a similar consensus. While both Japan's major political parties (the LDP and DPJ) advocate amending Article 9, inter-party (and intra-party) differences exist as to the nature of specific changes. Although both parties recognize the need to stipulate the right of self-defense, the overseas use of armed force and the prohibition on collective self defense remain items of contention.[75]

After September 11, one representative poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun found that 81 percent of respondents were "uneasy that a terrorist incident may occur in Japan like in the U.S." That the public responded strongly to September 11 should be expected. Having experienced a sarin attack at the hand of Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, Japan's population was already sensitive to the threat of terrorism.[76]

Japan reacted with shock to the terrorist attacks of 11, September 2001, and immediately focused on the implications of the attacks on the U.S.-Japan alliance. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro quickly set up an emergency task force in the prime minister's office within 45 minutes of the attacks and decided upon a series of responses.[77] After a week, on September 19, the Koizumi cabinet proceeded by proposing to send SDF airplanes and ships to assist the United States, strengthen the protection of the U.S. bases in Japan and emergency economic aid to Pakistan and India to ensure their support. On September 25, Koizumi met with President Bush in the U.S. where he assured his intentions of a speedy implementation of the plan. On the same day, the ruling parties agreed upon an outline for a law: support for the U.S. in the Indian Ocean, humanitarian assistance to refugees, and the prime ministerial decision of dispatch of the SDF.[78] As the Koizumi cabinet let the law be based on UN resolutions, the law would not inflict constitutional challenges. The law passed in the Diet in only three weeks.[79] The law stands out for the swiftness with which it was enacted. In Japan, laws of any kind are rarely enacted in less than a month. In the case of bills covering sensitive military and constitutional issues, such rapid passage is unprecedented.[80]

Prime Minister Koizumi identified the terrorist attack on US as 'Japan's own security issue'[81]. Koizumi ordered the dispatch of six ASDF transport aircraft to deliver relief supplies to Afghan refugees in Pakistan, ships of the MSDF, to the Arabian Sea to provide rear-area logistical support for U.S. military operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.[82]

The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill, which is introduced in early October 2001 and swiftly debated and enacted into law on October 29, permits SDF members to fire their weapons only in self-defense. It is limited in applicability to U.S. military actions taken in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, and to two years from the time of enactment in October 2001 (i.e., till October 2003), with one two-year extension permitted if approved by the Diet.[83]

The threat of terrorism appears to have partly motivated Japan's security behavior. Throughout the months following September 11, Koizumi reiterated that terrorism endangered the "lives and lifestyles of the people all over the world and the peace and security of all countries". He also described the war on terror as Japan's "own challenge".[84]

> The prime minister's apparent sense of alarm belied the Japanese government's mixed sentiment: only certain elements within the bureaucracy considered Al Qaeda a direct security threat. In contrast to other major powers—Britain and Russia, for example—Japan had never experienced Islamic terrorism. Tokyo's cordial relations with the Arab world and calibrated neutrality in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rendered Japan an unlikely target. To many officials and Diet members, terrorism therefore imperiled Japanese nationals abroad, but posed a minimal danger to the Japanese homeland. The Japanese government did not consider Al Qaeda and its ilk an immediate threat.[85]

In terms of Japanese public opinion and the wars in Iraq, according to Cabinet Office poll in February 1991, in the midst of the Gulf War, most respondents (56.4%) chose the 'Middle East issue', as the one that concerned them with regard to Japan's peace and security. However, the results changed significantly in the next poll in 1994; the concerns on Middle East issue dropped by two-thirds to 18.2%. In the poll in 2003, after the September 2002 Koizumi visit to Pyongyang, as many as 74.4% of respondents identified the Korean Peninsula as their primary concern. The geographical proximity of the Peninsula may have made Japan's public concern over national security more realistic than the Soviet threat during the Cold War period[86] or the developments in the Middle East (wars of Iraq). This reflects the fact that Japanese public opinion is heavily influenced by factors that may pose a threat by location for its region, and here is the reference to North Korea, China.

2. Japan's Motives for Participation in the Iraq War

> The Iraq War led to the most dramatic shift in Japan's defense policy. Three of the four factors:(external threats, Washington's influence, executive leadership, and generational change) that make up the transitional model—foreign threats, U.S. policy, and executive leadership—significantly influenced Japan's response to the removal of Saddam Hussein and post- conflict reconstruction.[87]

The security concerns from the threats of North Korea were prevailing in Japan in 2003 and Japan worked with its major allies to prevent any development of threats from happening and simultaneously took steps to expand its defensive military

capabilities. The Japanese public was increasingly fearful of a missile attack. But, in general, Japan has no interest in seeing the crisis with North Korea lead to conflict and maintained in 2003 its position that the North had to be convinced to give up its nuclear ambitions, the issue needed to be resolved diplomatically.[88]

In 2003, Koizumi and others in the LDP have taken full advantage of rising public fears of North Korea, while at the same time using the pretext of needing to cooperate with Japan's American ally, to cross several security thresholds.[89] Koizumi surprised many by his strong support for America's preemptive invasion of Iraq, and by mid-year, he had pledged to send troops from Japan's Self-Defense Force (SDF) to assist in postwar reconstruction. Public opinion in Japan was against these decisions as it was deeply worried about sending combat troops to an insecure area.[90]

Economically, the overall economy in Japan began to slow down at the beginning of 2003. Against the backdrop of the regional SARS epidemic and the disruption caused by the conflict in Iraq, economic growth during the first quarter of 2003 was essentially zero. Economists feared that Japan was about to enter a period of recession. Deflation continued to beset Japan. The monthly unemployment rate hit a new historic high in January, 5.5%, and then remained at 5.4% through July.[91] Since entering office, Koizumi has offered a different solution: reform and deregulation of the economic system through focusing on privatizing some government functions and reducing stifling bureaucratic regulations, raising the slogan of "reform without sacred cows". Thus, he faced a political crisis. His public support has eroded, falling below the 50% mark early in the year, well off the 80% approval ratings he enjoyed two years ago. The opposition led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), attacked Koizumi's lack of progress. Koizumi came also under constant attack from within the LDP's "old guard," to backtrack on reform.[92]

After the election of the LDP in 2003, Koizumi received a majority from the LDP Diet members, winning 194 out of 357 votes, and won the solid backing of the local chapters, where 205 out of 300 votes went to him, which enabled him eventually to stay in power till September 2006.[93]

Legislatively, Japan went a step further in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan by passing the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (Tero Taisaku Tokubetsu Sochi Ho) テロ対策特別措置法 and dispatching the Maritime SDF to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support for the U.S. military and NATO forces.[94] Therefore, from a historical perspective, not dispatching the SDF to Iraq while clearly supporting the military action there could have been seen as inconsistent, given the flow of the preceding events.[95]

Koizumi's strong position came in spite of numerous polls that showed that nearly 80% of the Japanese public opposed American invasion to Iraq.[96] Although Koizumi had posed as the champion of the people's will on the reform issue, he justified his stance towards the war and arguing: "there are times when we might make a mistake if we follow public opinion." In another telling comment, his chief cabinet secretary, Fukuda Yasuo, argued also that "U.S. public opinion cannot be ignored," in reference to the obvious American anger at the French for their lack of support.[97]

In January 2002, President Bush made a State of the Union address, containing a phrase, 'the Axis of Evil', to condemn

Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, for ‘arming to threaten the peace of the world.’[98]

> Two weeks later, the president visited Japan. In his speech at the Japanese parliament on 18 February, he praised Japan’s contribution to the war in Afghanistan, but did not mention anything about his plans for Iraq. On that day, Bush had a private meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi, which was joined only by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Deputy Minister Toshiyuki Takano. According to a media report released four months after the meeting, the president told Koizumi that the United States would attack Iraq. In his response, Koizumi told him that Japan would always be with the United States in the war against terrorism.[99]

If this report is accurate, as early as February 2002, over a year before the campaign began, the US intention to attack Iraq and Japan’s support for it were exchanged by the two national leaders.[100]

When the US forces opened fire on the Saddam’s regime on 19 March 2003, Japan’s public opinion was sharply split on whether the Japanese government should support the US attack. Immediately after the attack began, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi declared Japan’s support for the United States.[101]

"Now, at this juncture, based on such thoughts, I understand and support the engagement in the military action by the United States”[102]. Koizumi’s declaration of support indicated that Japan stood firmly on the U.S. side in the war, in light of Iraq’s repeated violations of some 16 U.N. resolutions and lack of cooperation in weapons inspections.[103]

> Koizumi’s strong support of the U.S. invasion of Iraq was in some ways inevitable, as most people in Japan recognize the need for American cooperation to resolve the North Korean issue. At the same time, Koizumi seems intent on using this unique opportunity to fulfill his long-time desire to move Japan toward a more active foreign policy role.[104] Koizumi stayed loyal to his decision of support throughout his period as prime minister.[105]

After the end of major combat operations in Iraq on 2 May, 2003, the Koizumi administration swiftly moved on a plan to dispatch the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq to provide reconstruction assistance. Within three months, Koizumi managed to pass (The Law Concerning the Special Measures on the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities) in the Diet.[106] The bill authorized the SDF to carry more significant weapons than had been the case in previous peacekeeping operations, but also stipulated that the troops could not use their weapons unless attacked.[107] Because of the growing controversy over the issue, the prime minister in late August decided to delay the proposed troop dispatch. Originally, Koizumi had hoped to send the troops before the end of the calendar year, but he decided to wait until the security situation had stabilized.[108]

2.1 The JSDF Engagement in Iraq and the role of the Japan- U.S. Coalition

The United States has no better friend in the world than Japan.[109] The Iraq dilemma had raised many questions on the U.S.-Japan relationship; the degree Japan was willing to support its most important ally; terrorism; threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD; biological and chemical); security and stability in the Middle East; as well as the constitutional

restrictions on the use of force collective self defense, and the operational use of the SDF.[110] Koizumi's decision to dispatch the SDF to Iraq in an ambiguous security condition created massive attention from media, discussions, and critique. Koizumi, relying on the public support for his premiership, was ready to fight politicians and bureaucrats, but only so with strong support from the electorate.[111]

> Scholars from the realist school, especially structural realism or neorealism, argue that Japan must play an international role in the framework of the US Japan alliance. During the Cold War era, Washington held the consensus that Japan was a very important element for the US global strategy to contain the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War era, however, the US–Japan alliance lost a clear common goal. Facing an uncertain security environment in Asia, such as Chinese emergence as a military power and North Korean brinkmanship diplomacy, Japan needed US presence in Asia. In order to maintain the alliance, Japan needs to take a more active role to revitalize the bilateral alliance.[112]

While the liberalist scholars, who emphasize international cooperation and interdependence, focus on the change in reactions from Asian countries towards the developments of the Japanese movements. Both realist and liberalist assertions assume a 'rational actor model' that ignores domestic political factors.[113]

Japan's reaction to the Gulf Crisis serves as an object lesson to the problems, limits, and perils of Japan's foreign policy. Gulf Crisis exposes Japan as a reactive state," which is more likely to change its policy because of outside pressure than due to strategic concerns. The Crisis shows the face of a wealthy weakling, uncertain, timid, slow-responding, conflicted, and vulnerable to outside pressure, especially American.[114] Obviously, this is not the "face" projected by Prime Minister Kaifu when he told a Japanese symposium in Tokyo on 25 June 1990, "From now on Japan will go out into the world and if there is a need, if there is a request from another party, we should not hesitate in meeting it"[115].

A good lesson Japan learned from the Gulf War was the importance of quickly labeling this situation as a crisis.[116] Due to failing to identify the Gulf Crisis of August 1990 as a "significant emergency, the issue was handled by the Foreign Ministry under normal diplomatic channels and not by the Cabinet Security Affairs Office which was designed to operate interagency coordination in an emergency. This significantly delayed Japan's crisis response.[117]

Due to the unpromising prospects for the equivocal and gradual change in the Japanese foreign politics, the Bush administration's hopes for speeding the development of a more "mature partnership" with Japan depended heavily on the emergence of a strong leader willing and able to pull it in that direction.[118] Koizumi's election as LDP leader and Japan's prime minister in April 2001 was greeted with enthusiasm by many American observers. They were impressed by his extraordinary popularity with the Japanese public and by his talk about implementing bold economic reforms and revitalizing the American alliance. He also won plaudits for his advocacy of constitutional revision and reconsideration of the ban on collective self defense, as well as for his personal rapport with President Bush.[119]

With Japan willing to play the role of dutiful ally, the Bush administration seemed quite happy with the state of U.S.-Japan relations. U.S. officials praised Japan lavishly throughout the year, with Ambassador Howard Baker labeling the country America's most dependable ally

after the United Kingdom. U.S. officials even managed to hide their disappointment over Japan's decision to delay the troop deployment.[120]

U.S. officials have pushed very strongly behind the scenes for Japan to put "boots on the ground." Even if this deployment does not amount to much in terms of military capabilities, the U.S. desperately wants the symbolic value of adding a major participant to the "coalition of the willing".[121]

The 11 September 2001 attacks on U.S. transformed Japan's domestic and international environment, providing Koizumi with unprecedented opportunity to launch high-profile initiatives to expand Japan's international military role. The graphic horror of the attacks inspired a wave of solidarity with the U.S. and its war on terrorism including the international military action against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.[122] Koizumi was clearly pursuing "change within continuity" approach renzokuseinonakanohenkaku 連続性の中の変革 .[123] Washington felt surprised and pleased by Koizumi success in delivering an unexpectedly robust Japanese contribution in Afghanistan. It seemed an opportunity at hand to accelerate Japan's evolution into stronger and more self-confident ally.[124]

> The Bush administration's game plan for nudging it in that direction wisely eschewed heavy-handed external pressure in favor of quiet diplomacy and positive reinforcement-an approach that enabled Koizumi to stress the independent character of his imitative and parry charges of subservience to Washington.[125]

Japan hosted an international conference about Afghanistan in 2002, and extended the antiterrorism legislation of 2001 for stationing Maritime Self-Defense Forces ships in the Indian Ocean. The looming prospect of the U.S. military action against Iraq inspired active discussion within the Koizumi government of the ways that Japan might support the United States.[126] The Bush Administration's division of the international community in allies and foes ("either with us or against us") tekikamikataka 敵か味方か and its unilateral approach to invading Iraq without the Security Council endorsement brought complicated ethical, military and political considerations to all of the traditional allies of the U.S. including Japan.[127]

Highly salient bilateral trade frictions would have made Japan a prime target for retaliation if it had abstained from supporting the U.S. war effort. Indeed, in September 1990, the House of Representatives voted 370 to 53 to start withdrawing troops from Japan unless Tokyo increased its "burden-sharing" contributions to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Congressional action was a reflection of popular sentiment; 70% of American poll respondents said Japan was not providing satisfactory support for the Gulf War effort.[128] After the Americans made their displeasure, Japan announced it would contribute funding to the coalition against Iraq in 1990. The initial announcement referred to a figure of only $10 million. The next day, following an extremely frosty American response, the Ministry of Finance came out with an amended figure of $1 billion. Anxious not to alienate the Americans any further, the Japanese government later supplemented this amount with further funding, ultimately bringing the total to some $13 billion.[129]

There was a sense in Washington that Japan should share in the risk and toil by making a human contribution as well. One factor driving this desire was that the failure by Japan to make any personnel contribution might provoke a wave of resentment in the U.S. that would put the alliance at risk.[130] Thus, Japanese officials were made to understand that a Japanese failure to contribute would have grave consequences for the alliance. As a top Japanese diplomat warned early in the crisis,

"The gap between what the Americans want and what the Japanese are willing to do is simply enormous."[131] By 2001, this enormous gap seemed to have largely closed, primarily because U.S. expectations about a post-September 11 Japanese contribution to U.S. military operations had greatly diminished.[132]

Japanese politics seems full of ambivalence towards the U.S because of many reasons. First, the U.S. defeated Japan in the war, used two nuclear bombs against it, occupied it for about 7 years and wrote its Constitution. The U.S. still has many military bases on the Japanese territories. Therefore, those nationalist attempts to strengthen Japan internationally may find it peculiar that the U.S. still plays a vital role in Japanese security[133]. Second, the fear of entrapment has led to arguments that Japan should reduce the alliance commitment. The third reason, the fear of abandonment may lead to a desire to independently be able to protect Japan but may lead also to calls for a strengthened relationship with the U.S.[134]

There were some pressing factors that led to the speedy engagement, including external and domestic factors, and could be identified by four major factors. Of the four factors, (external threats, Washington's influence, executive leadership, and generational change), only U.S. policy and prime ministerial leadership exerted a decisive influence and motivated Japan's security behavior in the aftermath of September 11.[135]

> Behind closed doors, the United States in effect did call upon Japan to "show the flag." The humiliation of the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent milestones in Japan's defense policy led Tokyo to internalize U.S. and international expectations. As a result, officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the JDA challenged constitutional restraints in their haste to demonstrate Japan's commitment to the bilateral alliance and global security.[136]

In addition to the above regional and international factors, and circumstances surrounding, which led Japan to the participation of the United States in the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, it is necessary to address the internal affairs, whether at the grassroots, parliamentary, partisan or even personal levels of leaders and bureaucrats, which contributed to preparing the conditions for such participation.

2.2 Domestic Factors:

2.2.1 Balance of power in the Diet

A shift in the balance of power in the Diet would seem to offer the best proximate reason for the government's ability to enact the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law authorizing, among other things, the dispatch of the MSDF to the Arabian Sea and The Law Concerning the Special Measures on the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities, to dispatch SDF to Iraq.

2.2.2 Leadership[137]

From April 2001 to August 2006, Koizumi was the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) prime minister in Japan. Compared to the fast-changing cabinets of the 1990s, this stability was a remarkable achievement. Through four national elections, Koizumi guided the LDP to success.[138] The LDP had never seen such an ardent fighter against their consensus politics.

With his provocative, conflict-oriented political style, Koizumi attracted massive media attention. He changed the rules of the political game within the LDP through neglecting factions when appointing and reshuffling his cabinets and exercising strong top-down leadership.[139] Koizumi has made significant structural reforms. In addition to the government reforms, public corporations reforms, he acted upon a populist worldview, in which he presented himself as the spokesman of the people in a struggle with the Japanese elite. In foreign policy, Koizumi supported the U.S. War on Terrorism and sought to participate in the war and occupation efforts.[140] The 2005 September Lower House election resulted in a landslide victory for Koizumi's party – among the best election in LDP's history.[141]

Koizumi was a politician with libertarian beliefs in human beings and society, with an emphasis on individual freedom which led to a neoliberal attitude toward the Japanese state and markets. Koizumi's structural reforms were concerned with shrinking the size of the government, increasing competition in the public and private sector and dealing with the existence of substantial amounts of bad debt.[142] Two of the most important policy proposals were Koizumi's attempts to privatize the public highway companies and the postal services.[143] Through his structural reform program, Koizumi was successful to the extent that he remained a popular politician and the undefeated leader of the LDP for over five years. To stay in power for this long without much formal support in the LDP, but with high support among the electorate and in the media, was somewhat of an achievement.[144]

> Koizumi was a candidate for the presidency of the LDP three times, but twice he failed to achieve the highest number of votes – in 1995 and 1998. The third time, in April 2001, Koizumi somewhat surprisingly won the internal LDP leadership election. Koizumi went on to lead the LDP through four parliamentary elections – with the 2005 election as the largest triumph.[145]

Koizumi thought that the main challenge to restoring the greatness of the Japanese economy was the unhealthy relationship between politicians, bureaucrats and vested interests. He was even ready to destroy his own party if the LDP politicians did not support his reform agenda,[146] repeating that important reform of the LDP and the Japanese economy were two sides of the same coin.[147]

Moreover, Koizumi continued criticizing the LDP situation saying: "the people are disgusted by the condition where there are only factions but no country!" He gained more trust and support with his perception of the LDP politicians being more concerned with intra-party quarrels instead of taking seriously the problems that ordinary people faced.[148] He developed a unique and aggressive populist stance towards his party. When he understood that the privatization bill might fail to pass the Diet, he threatened to dissolve the Diet.[149]

Koizumi had mainly focused on domestic issues during his political career, and he had less diplomatic experience.[150] However, he was one of the most active prime ministers in Japanese foreign affairs post-WWII. A day after his start-up as prime minister of Japan, on April 27,2001, Koizumi presented his views on foreign policy, Japan's WWII responsibility and the U.S.-Japan relationship.[151]

> "I believe that during the post-war period, in order for Japan to develop peacefully, the most important thing has been to reflect

first on the Second World War, from which has come the realization that Japan must never again wage war. A policy for the future of Japan of the utmost importance is how to encourage the creation of a peaceful and respectable nation, through endeavors of the people of Japan. If the question were to be directly asked as to why Japan plunged itself into war, I believe that the most appropriate answer would be to say that Japan isolated itself from the international community. In order to see to it that never again does Japan wage war, it is of the utmost importance that the country never again isolates itself from international cooperation and the international community. From this perspective, I consider the basis for the future of Japan's diplomacy to be the friendly functioning of the Japan-United States relationship, which to date has been the most important foundation from which Japan operates. While never forgetting this foundation of Japan's diplomacy, I am convinced that through friendly and close cooperation between Japan and the United States, we can create a cooperative structure with the other countries of the world. In particular, it is of the greatest importance to maintain close and warm relations with other countries in the region, including the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation. Founded on sound relations with these countries and the foundation provided by the Japan-U.S. relationship, I believe we can further improve and develop Japan's international relations, a point that should underpin Japan's diplomacy."[152]

Executive leadership, along with outside expectations, played a critical role in shaping Tokyo's contribution to the war on terror. Koizumi circumvented his government's standard foreign policy-making procedures to expedite Japan's antiterrorism contribution. The prime minister also used speeches and summit diplomacy to direct (internal pressure) naiatsu(内圧) against his opponents.[153]

Koizumi said in the Diet, "If I follow public opinion, I will make a mistake. Even though the majority of citizens do not understand my decision, I have to carry out the policy which needs to be implemented".[154] The coalition government passed the Iraq support in July 2003 authorizing dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq, which occurred in January 2004.[155]

Koizumi has been eager to strengthen Japan's alliance with the U.S., symbolized by his close personal relations with President Bush, as the cornerstone of his foreign policy. This stance has raised concerns that Koizumi is a captive to Bush's controversial policies.[156] By making personality an element in policy controversies, Koizumi has compelled his rivals to follow suit: they now must look beyond the advice of state bureaucrats and established interest groups for ideas and support.[157]

2.2.3 Feeling of Shame

Shame might be a third factor. In essence, participation in the post-September 11 coalition can be seen as a way for Japan to recover from the shame it felt in the face of charges that the country had engaged in "checkbook diplomacy" during the Gulf War 1991.[158] Japan's provision of financial support rather than troops during the Gulf War had made it being described as a reactive state, passive in security policy, freeriding on US power, refusing to bear the responsibilities of an ally due to the constraints of Article 9 of its constitution.[159] Probably the bitterest memory for many Japanese was Kuwait's failure to include Japan in a list of allied countries it thanked for liberating the emirate, despite Tokyo's $13 billion contribution to the war effort.[160]

This sense of shame created a “never again” reflex, producing strong support for dispatching the SDF in 2001. A former Japanese diplomat, Okamoto Yukio, said that Japan was laughed off by the rest of the world as little more than a “cash dispenser”.[161] Koizumi appointed Okamoto as a top foreign policy advisor, apparently because Koizumi shared Okamoto’s desire to prevent a repeat of the Gulf War debacle. Since his appointment, Okamoto has played a pivotal role in Koizumi’s post-September-11 foreign policy.[162]

There are several reasons helped the quick and easy passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law; Koizumi’s high popularity during his first nine months in office, his independence from the LDP’s Diet factions and strong support for Japan’s playing a larger military role.[163] One of the results of the Gulf War itself is the apparent shift of public opinion in favor of overseas non-combat missions for the SDF, and even claim that Japanese mass opinion shared the sense of shame that elites felt for failing to dispatch the SDF to the Middle East in 1990. Japanese domestic opinion was more supportive in 2001 than in 1990.[164]

Bush administration announced that it would exercise the right of self-defense by acting preemptively against threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism, advancing a hard-line policy that reserved the option of military action against Iraq. The U.S. government also stated that wars were best fought by “coalitions of the willing”.[165]

Before studying the stances of Japan regarding the U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003 without a new U.N. resolution, it is necessary to review Japan’s stances regarding the past cases of Iraq since 1990:

When the Gulf War broke out in 1991, the Japanese government declared “firm support” for the U.S. based on Resolution 678, which approved military action by the Multi-National Force.[166] And when the U.S. and other countries launched strikes on Iraq in December 1998, the Japanese government supported the U.S. again, based on the same resolution.[167] When the U.S. and other countries struck at Iraq in January 1993 and September 1996, respectively, the Japanese government supported the U.S. under the conditions that the military action be “limited” and a “necessary measure to maintain the performance of the U.N. resolution.[168] But when the U.S. attacked Iraq in June 1993 and attack Afghanistan and the Sudan in August 1998, Japan refrained from directly supporting the U.S. because of doubts about the legality of these actions, stating only that “action was unavoidable and understandable.[169]

One can conclude that Japan’s 2003 declaration of support for the U.S., despite much debate over the legality of the war on Iraq in the first place, was a break from tradition.[170] After the experience the Gulf War in 1991, Japan searched for a more active international security role through the dispatch of minesweepers to the Gulf and participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations.[171] On April 26, 1991, five minesweepers and one supply ship from Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force set sail for the Middle East to participate in the cleanup of the Gulf in the aftermath of operation Desert Storm against Iraq. This dispatch was Japan’s way of making up to the United States for its failure to contribute military to the war against Saddam Hussein. This decision marked the country’s first military foray abroad since 1945.[172]

3. The Nature of the Task of JSDF

After July 2003, the security situation in Iraq witnessed more deterioration. An attack on Italian troops in Nasariya in mid-November, which killed 18 soldiers, appeared to be a deliberate attempt to target non-American coalition forces. Nasariya is only 50 miles east of the town of Samawah, the proposed Japanese deployment site.[173] Later in the month, al-Qaeda warned Japan that its troops would be a target of retaliation if it sent to Iraq. Furthermore, Japanese opinion was unsettled by the assassination of two of its diplomats in Iraq on November 29, 2003, on their way to a reconstruction conference in Tikrit when they were ambushed.[174]

> In early December, Japanese government released detailed guidelines for the eventual deployment of 1,000 SDF personnel. Japan would send 550 soldiers from the Ground Self-Defense Force who were authorized to carry sidearms, machine guns, and antitank rocket launchers. These troops were to be augmented by 300 sailors and five or six ships from the Maritime Self-Defense force, plus 150 members of the Air Self-Defense Force, along with four military transport planes. The main area of deployment for the ground troops was to be in Samawah, but other Japanese forces were to be based near the Baghdad International Airport.[175]

> Koizumi was not able to let the SDF participate in the wartime operations. Nor was he able to let the SDF participate in policing and security measures. Instead, the SDF participated only in humanitarian relief and reconstruction work in a post-war situation. Due to strict limitations on the use of force, the SDF was protected by other countries' military engagement in Iraq; first the Dutch, then the Australians.[176]

Economically, compared to Japan's $13 billion financial contribution following the Gulf War, SDF dispatch to Iraq has occurred on the cheap: the SDF's activities in Samawah cost approximately $120 million per year.[177]

At a press conference on December 9, 2003, Koizumi expressed: "First of all, this dispatch of SDF is for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq. They will not engage in the use of force. They will not participate in combative activities. They are not going to war." He continues with a legitimation of SDF dispatch on the basis of the international community[178]:

> "Indeed, I believe that the international community is calling upon Japan, and the people of Japan to act in accordance with the ideals of our Constitution. I call upon the members of the SDF to undertake activities that conform to the spirit and ideals of the Constitution. This is fully justified and shows the fact that we are not thinking only of our nation. The stability and peaceful development of Iraq is essential for Iraq itself, as well as necessary for Japan. Indeed, it is necessary for the security of the world[179]". Now, asking me, for the sake of realizing world peace and security, I believe that it is not a question of sakoku 鎖国 or opening up the country, but instead whether standing-alone-pacifism ikkoku heiwa shugi 一国平和主義 is good or that international cooperation is good. I think Japan alone is not able to preserve Japan's security.[180]

3.1 The role of Cabinet Secretariat to initiate security policies

The Cabinet Secretariat has been playing an important role in Japan's policymaking. It is defined as the "final organ" of the Japanese government for policy coordination.[181] Politically difficult issues are brought to the Secretariat to be coordinated and resolved under the leadership of the prime minister and the Chief of Cabinet Secretariat.[182] The former chief of Cabinet Secretariat Gotoda Masaharu summarizes his old job as "to mediate and settle disputes" among various government agencies in the policy-making process.[183] The administrative reforms passed in July 1999 and the institutional changes have strengthened the power and function of the Cabinet Secretariat. This body plays an instrumental role as "core executive"[184] and has been considered equivalent to the U.S. White House or the British Prime Minister's Office.[185]

In terms of the mechanism of drafting laws, coordination among ministries and leadership, the position of the Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS) is very important. Article 9 of the Cabinet Law stipulates that "if the prime minister is absent or has an accident, a state minister designated by him in advance shall assume the duties as prime minister as a tentative measure."[186] The CCS is always at the top of the list and will continue to be so unless the position of the deputy prime minister is officially introduced.[187]

> The position of the administrative deputy CCS is also vital as it has five major functions: (1) policy coordination, (2) handling issues brought to cabinet meetings, (3) chairing sub-cabinet meetings, (4) screening appointments of high officials, and (5) advising vice ministers.[188]

The parliamentary deputies CCS are often chosen from the prime minister's faction and serve a different function from that of the administrative one. Their tasks vary depending on their interests and expertise. Mr. Abe Shinzo (2000–03), for example, spent most of his time dealing with foreign affairs and national security issues.[189] Although the parliamentary deputy CCS is a sub-cabinet position, the post is often more important in terms of policymaking than some cabinet positions are. This is why senior LDP members with prior cabinet experience were sometimes appointed to the post.[190]

In order to clarify and strengthen the premier's authority in terms of proposing important, basic policies at the Cabinet meetings, the Cabinet Law had been revised many times. The authority and function of the Cabinet Secretariat were also reinforced.[191] In May 2000, a Cabinet decision was issued to instruct other ministries to recognize that 'the Cabinet Secretariat is the highest and final organ for policy coordination under the Cabinet.[192] The revised law allows the Secretariat to initiate policies by clearly providing the authority to "plan and draft" under the direction of the cabinet and the prime minister.[193] The policy coordination system guidelines which is approved by the cabinet in May 2000, places the Cabinet Secretariat above other ministries and agencies. Statutorily, the prime minister and the cabinet can initiate and proceed with policy processes independently from the relevant ministries and the Cabinet Secretariat can finalize policy coordination with stronger legal authority.[194]

The Cabinet Secretariat successfully promulgated, and has been administering, 12 more major laws under the Koizumi Cabinet, as of September 2005. Six laws are directly related to national security.[195] The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures

Law (promulgated on October 29, 2001), The Iraq Special Measures Law (August 1, 2003)[196] were among them. The antiterrorism legislation was a smooth passage for a major law allowing Japan to dispatch SDF units abroad in times of combat for the first time.[197]

> After passage of the anti-terrorism legislation, Prime Minister Koizumi tried to take advantage of the momentum to pass the contingency legislation, which would provide a framework for dealing with an emergency in case of a military attack on Japan but this legislation had been opposed strongly by the opposition parties arguing that such legislation would be a step toward Japan's remilitarization.[198]

Prime Minister Koizumi has competent assistants in his office; Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda and his deputy Shinzo Abe. These two politicians have provided necessary and political advice and made competent decisions when needed.[199] Shinzo Abe served as assistant to his father, Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe in the early 1980s, and is very familiar with foreign policy issues.[200]

The proposed bills (for dispatching SDF to Afghanistan and Iraq) clarified the government's decision-making process, strengthened the authority of the prime minister, facilitated action by the Self-Defense Forces, and limited personal rights in case of emergency.[201] In both legislations, the Koizumi administration followed the same strategy. The same task force within the Cabinet Secretariat drafted the contingency bills. For the bill for Afghanistan, a combined 90% of the Diet members who attended voted for it which is considered as one of the most controversial pieces of legislation in Japan's postwar history. The legislation for dispatching SDF to Iraq passed the Diet in July 2003, and Tokyo dispatched its forces in February 2004.[202]

3.2 Bottom – Top Policy at the government and the LDP

Traditionally, Japan adopts bottom-up system policy process for legislation laws, in which the bureaucrats in the ministries play a central role with the governing coalition or the governing political party to negotiate with them.[203]

> When the prime minister did provide policy direction, he instructed the related Cabinet minister. The minister in turn gave instructions to his vice minister, the bureau chief, and the director of the related section. If an officer in the chain of command sabotaged the measure, however, the policy did not survive.[204] 'The bureau meetings are the actual decision-making organ within the bureaucracy".[205]

There are many official meetings at higher levels before the Cabinet meetings on the levels of ministry meetings, administrative vice-ministerial meetings. However, the steps of the policy process taken after the bureau meeting are really nothing more than confirmation.[206]

On the party level, the bottom-up policy process also existed. The LDP's Policy Research Council had 13 subcommittees and more than 30 research commissions.[207] Traditionally, the subcommittees served as the first forum the government consulted on a proposal.[208] Since the LDP controlled the government for a long time after the war, an approval at the subcommittee level was virtually the same to the bureaucrats as a de facto approval in the Diet.[209] Once the subcommittee

approved a policy, it was brought to the full Policy Research Council, and finally to the LDP General Council, where the decision had to be unanimous.[210]

3.3 Koizumi's top-down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq

Koizumi's policy strategy was top-down in the sense that the policy proposals were produced in cooperation between the kantei 官邸 (prime minister office) and the cabinet and with input from external non-parliamentary committees.[211] Koizumi sought to keep the bureaucracy outside the policy preparation process.[212]

> Koizumi inherited a political system that so inhibited a prime minister's power it had been called an 'Un-Westminster' system with a 'leadership deficit'. But by the time Koizumi led his party to a stunning and overwhelming victory in the September 2005 general election, he had moved Japan closer to a top-down 'Westminster' model of cabinet government than at any time in the post-war era.[213]

Westminster system centralizes power in the hands of the party leadership and prime minister. Call it the Britannicization of Japan.[214]

In Westminister systems, the 'Cabinet under the prime minister conducts substantive policy debate and takes charge of policymaking. Ministers both collectively in Cabinet and individually as heads of ministries are the source and authority of all major government policies.'[215] Ruling party members outside the government have little direct influence on the policy making. The Japanese bureaucracy has 'formidable control over the function of policy advice, initiation, formulation and implementation. The ruling party, not the executive, is the only political institution with sufficient power to bargain and negotiate with bureaucrats.' In Japan's 'Un-Westminster' system[216], the role of the prime minister and his Cabinet is very limited.[217]

In the pre-Koizumi era, Japan has had a very weak Cabinet that simply rubber-stamped decisions made by others. Any legislative proposal to reach the level of Cabinet endorsement and thence to the Diet floor had to be approved by all relevant LDP committees, among them, most importantly, the seisakuchosakai 政策調査会 (Policy Affairs Research Committee), its bukai 部会 (subcommittees), and the Somukai 総務会 (General Affairs Committee).[218] Koizumi has been successful in his attempts to centralize the party. Throughout his term, he has been a tactful strategist and a great campaigner.[219] It was Koizumi who smashed long-standing taboos and created the conditions for ending Japan's foreign and security policy inertia.[220]

> He challenged the status quo according to the un-Westminster system and ignored the unwritten rules. He simply decided that a majority vote sufficed to determine the collective will of the Somukai 総務会 (General Affairs Committee), thereby stripping his opponents of the veto power that the unanimity rule had afforded them.[221]

The steps that Koizumi took were all intended to centralize the decision-making structure of the LDP.[222] Without a doubt, factions habatsu 派閥 have been decisively weakened under Koizumi.[223] Immediately following the 2005 elections, Koizumi succeeded in imposing a term limit on chairman positions for LDP committees.[224] Koizumi became LDP president on the basis of the popular vote of LDP supporters, so he has the legitimacy that he utilized against his intraparty opponents.[225]

> Koizumi has shown that the new rules of the game have transformed the formal prerogatives of the LDP president and prime minister into real sources of power. Koizumi's success has established the importance of the party leader at the electoral polls. Maintaining a popular leader who can communicate policy goals to voters benefits everyone in the party. Because they lack the kind of party loyalty characteristic of old-fashioned organized interests, unorganized voters' support is easier to win over but also harder to keep.[226]

Koizumi implemented a new form of 'top-down' decision-making in foreign policy by using the strengthened institutions of the prime minister's office, and bypassing traditional consensus building within the Liberal Democratic Party and amongst the central ministries.[227] During his era, most key foreign-policy initiatives were taken by the prime minister, the chief cabinet secretary, with occasional input from trusted confidants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries.[228]

After 11 September 2001, Koizumi showed a strong inclination to gamble in foreign policy; the Diet passed an Anti-Terrorism Law by October 2001 dispatching the MSDF and ASDF to the Indian Ocean to support the U.S. forces in Afghanistan.[229] The legislation required only three weeks of debate to pass both houses, compared with months for previous security legislation. In the wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq, Koizumi gambled again enacting legislation to dispatch Ground, Air and Maritime Self Defense Forces to Iraq.[230]

Koizumi administration seemed ready for the war in Iraq. In his reaction to the invasion, Koizumi held at the same day of the beginning of the operations on 20 March 2003, a Security Council meeting, and decided upon an Action Guideline.[231]

> Immediately after this meeting, Koizumi held an emergency Cabinet meeting to decide on the establishment of a 'Policy Measures Headquarters on the Problem of Iraq' in the Cabinet. Following the Cabinet meeting, he immediately held the first meeting of this newly established headquarters to decide: to provide assistance to countries neighboring Iraq; to strengthen Japan's support in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and other areas; and to prepare new legislation to enable Japan to contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq. These swift and smooth reactions showed clearly demonstrated Koizumi's determination. The policy-making process was initiated by the Cabinet Secretariat. Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary was instructed to form a team to prepare legislation. A dozen officials from the MOFA, JDA, and other agencies were gathered in the Cabinet Office building. MOFA's headquarters on this policy matter were the National Security Division of Foreign Policy Bureau, the United Nations Policy Division of the same bureau, and the Legal Affairs Division of Treaty Bureau. The Iraq legislation was prepared in the framework of international collaboration, not in the framework of the US-Japan alliance. As for preparation for legislation, the SDF (Ground, Maritime, and Air) played a subordinate role.[232]

3.4 The role of the Opposition Parties towards the SDF Participation

As the war against Iraq started, DPJ members argued that continued inspections in Iraq might have peacefully disarmed Saddam's regime. Many also considered the U.S. attack illegitimate given the absence of a new UN resolution.[233] However, opposition to deploying the SDF was neither uniform nor solely inspired by a divergent outlook on the legitimacy of the war. Some members of the DPJ not only supported SDF involvement in the rebuilding of Iraq but actually, attended the farewell ceremony for SDF personnel deployed to Iraq. Observers considered these cleavages were generational[234]. Moreover, the oppositions parties (the DPJ in particular) may have opposed the dispatch partly on the grounds of domestic politics and needed to differentiate itself from the LDP in the November 2003 Lower House election. The DPJ members were betting

that the possible SDF casualties in Iraq would provoke a public backlash against the LDP-led government. Therefore, the DPJ vocally opposed an SDF role in Iraq reconstruction.[235]

> The debates over dispatching troops to Iraq among the political parties focused more on policy timing and procedures than on the more fundamental constitutional challenge. The opposition parties criticized the PM for blindly endorsing Bush's war, questioned his judgment over the alleged presence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and argued that sending troops would violate the Iraq special law's provision that troops can only be sent to "non-combat zones. The DPJ's success in the November election, spurred in part by its opposition to dispatching the SDF, led many to assume that Koizumi would move more cautiously on his deployment plans.[236]

The DPJ desired to be counted as a responsible party in foreign affairs, and therefore, the DPJ presented their own Iraq legislation. The DPJ wanted the legislation to be based on UN Security Council Resolution 1483 where the UN requested that the international community support Iraq's reconstruction instead of including resolution 678, 687 and 1441 as the LDP did.[237] The three latter resolutions "legitimized" the American attack on Iraq.[238]

The DPJ has insisted that the SDF should go only as part of a peacekeeping force under U.N. command. Thus, the party has parted ways from the traditional Left parties that deem any such activity unconstitutional.[239] The Japan Communist Party (JCP) continues to call for the complete implementation of Article 9, for a staged process of military reductions, and for disbanding the SDF.[240]

> Reflecting its religious base, Komeito　公　明　党 maintains strong pacifist rhetoric in its manifesto, but it has compromised significantly on security policy in return for entry to the ruling coalition. It supported dispatch of the SDF to the Middle East, acquiesced to LDP plans to elevate the JDA to ministry status, and supports debate on constitutional revision.[241]

3.5 SDF participation in Iraq and Japanese public attitudes

The opportunity for SDF participation in peacekeeping operations increased PKOs after 1990. Such participation provided Japan a politically acceptable way to participate in international security.[242] Japan's constitutional constraints on participation diminished and the possibilities for participation expanded. Public opinion still preferred minor changes in security policy and limited non-combat roles for the SDF in PKOs.[243]

> In order to explain the impact of public opinion on foreign policy, there are two approaches: The elitist approach and the pluralist approach. The first one argues that public attitudes are inherently uninformed, incoherent, and unstable, and thus irrelevant to explaining foreign policy outcomes and subject to easy manipulation at the hands of foreign policy elites. While the pluralist approach sees public opinion as stable and composed of rational and coherent foreign policy views.[244]

Japanese public opinion supports military power to defend Japan's sovereignty and territory, and the citizens are not pacifist as conventional wisdom might hold but they worry about deploying or using military force outside Japan because of the scourge of World War II.[245]

> Japan’s defensive posture has in large part been shaped by Japanese public opinion, which has in general been distrustful in the postwar period of the state’s ability to control the military and consequently remained opposed to the deployment of the JSDF for combat operations and ultimately restrained the policymakers, who are careful to avoid provoking opposition to its policies.[246]

It is widely accepted that pacifist public opinion had prevented the Japan from taking an active security role in the international community. The public opinion was a very important factor in the national security policymaking under the Koizumi administration.[247]

> Compared to the North Korea issue, the Iraq debate was more heated among intellectuals than with the general public. Tokyo saw no massive anti-war demonstrations comparable to those in European capitals; support for sending Self-Defense Forces was surprisingly high. The Asahi newspaper’s polls, taken monthly from December 2003 to March 2004, show support and (opposition) at 34 (55), 40 (48), 44 (48), and 42 (41)%, respectively.[248]

After September 11, 2001 there was very little public support for SDF participation in overseas combat operations. A Nippon Television poll in mid-September 2001 found that only 8% of respondents supported such participation.[249] A poll at the end of the month found that 46% opposed Koizumi’s plan for sending the SDF to the Arabian Sea, versus 42% who supported it.[250]

> Once it became clear that the SDF would not be deployed anywhere near a combat zone and would indeed only engage in non-combat operations, support increased. A poll in late January 2002 revealed that 64% of Japanese supported the non-combat dispatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean, versus 23% who were opposed.[251]

In spite of the fact that grass-roots groups were not close from the parties regarding the war and persist in efforts to promote pacifism but their movements reflected regional solidarity more than the country pacifism.[252] In 2001, 25,000 people gathered to protest Prime Minister Koizumi's support of the "revengeful war" in Afghanistan by the United States-just 10 percent of the crowds that gathered in 1960 to protest revision of the security treaty.[253] In 2002, only three gatherings attracted more than 10,000 participants, and Japanese protest of the Iraq invasion in 2003 paled in comparison to that in the world's other democracies. By 2004, antiwar protests focused on the U.S. bases, but the pacifists were more out of step, and more marginalized, than ever.[254]

Summary

Although the 11 September 2001 attacks on U.S. and the wars in Iraq 1990 and 2003 transformed Japan’s domestic and international environment, providing with unprecedented opportunity to launch high-profile initiatives to expand Japan’s international military role, the general trend of the security policies has not deviated from the traditional. This is due to the complex nature of the relationship between Japan and the United States, domestic politics (political parties and public opinion), the continuous debate over Article 9 of the Constitution.

Prime Minister Koizumi provoked widespread controversy in his domestic policies and decisions in his quest to strengthen the relationship between Japan and the United States, but this quest did not pay off. US pressures on Japan has been still continuing over many issues such as burdens of the US troops on the Japanese territories, the security treaty as "one-sided", trade agreements and calling to change the constitution as well as the participation of SDF with the coalitions to provide security of the sea lanes.

Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution does not mention self-defense or collective self-defense. Even the success of the Japanese government in 2014 in reinterpreting the Article 9 to enable it to exercise collective self-defense is not considered as a substitute for an amendment the article to suit the pursuit of a more effective role at the regional and international level, especially matters related to international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

Border problems with Japan's neighbors, the dispute over islands and China's political and military emergence, as well as the heavy legacy of pre-World War II history put more pressures on Japanese policies, requiring a redoubling of diplomatic efforts to gain more confidence to accommodate these impacts. Such efforts will help the regional countries' understanding of the security and constitutional steps that the ruling LDP is working on.

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